Ex-Post Evaluation of Enforcement: A Principal-Agent Perspective

14 Pages Posted: 26 May 2011

See all articles by Damien J. Neven

Damien J. Neven

University of Geneva; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Hans Zenger

European Union - Directorate General for Competition

Date Written: December 1, 2008

Abstract

This paper discusses a number of methodological challenges that ex-post evaluation of competition policy faces. We argue that imprecise measurement and simplified analysis not only leads to unreliable results, but also triggers behavioral responses by competition authorities. Because evaluation works as an incentive scheme, it has an immediate impact on the way agencies operate. Faced with simplistic assessment, authorities may be tempted to be overly interventionist, to spend too many resources and to ignore relevant information. Therefore, a careful design of methodologies is important to ensure that ex-post control does not bring about the very ills it is supposed to cure.

Keywords: ex-post evaluation, competition policy, incentive scheme

JEL Classification: L49, K21, K41

Suggested Citation

Neven, Damien J. and Zenger, Hans, Ex-Post Evaluation of Enforcement: A Principal-Agent Perspective (December 1, 2008). De Economist, Vol. 156, No. 4, pp. 477-490, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1845392

Damien J. Neven

University of Geneva ( email )

Graduate Institute of International Studies
CH-1211 Geneve 4
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Hans Zenger (Contact Author)

European Union - Directorate General for Competition ( email )

Place Madou, Madouplein 1
Saint-Josse-ten-Noode/Sint-Joost-ten-Noode
Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
104
Abstract Views
1,126
rank
290,016
PlumX Metrics