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Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach

Avery W. Katz

Columbia University - Law School

March 19, 2011

Suffolk University Law Review, Forthcoming
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 402

The concept of “efficient breach” - the idea that a contracting party should be encouraged to breach a contract and pay damages if doing so would be more efficient than performance – is probably the most influential concept in the economic analysis of contract law. It is certainly the most controversial. Efficient breach theory has been criticized from both within and without the economic approach, but the most prominent criticism is that it violates deontological ethics - that the beneficiary of a promise has a right that it be performed, so that breaching the promise wrongs the promisee.

This essay argues that this criticism is misplaced, and that efficient breach theory, properly understood, is entirely consistent with parties’ complying with their deontological obligations. Instead, the intuitive resistance that most people experience to the concept may be better explained by aretaic concerns - specifically, that failing to complete a contractual relationship is not conducive to virtuous character or to the maintenance of a flourishing community. While efficient breach can be squared with deontological ethics, it cannot be squared with virtue ethics unless one is prepared to argue that seeking efficiency is a virtue, or at least that it is not a vice.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Efficient breach, contract damages, virtue ethics

JEL Classification: K12

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Date posted: May 19, 2011 ; Last revised: June 3, 2011

Suggested Citation

Katz, Avery W., Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach (March 19, 2011). Suffolk University Law Review, Forthcoming; Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 402. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1845703 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1845703

Contact Information

Avery W. Katz (Contact Author)
Columbia University - Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-0066 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)

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