Antitrust Review of the AT&T/T-Mobile Transaction

40 Pages Posted: 31 May 2011 Last revised: 25 Dec 2013

See all articles by Allen P. Grunes

Allen P. Grunes

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP

Maurice E. Stucke

University of Tennessee College of Law

Date Written: May 18, 2011

Abstract

In this Essay, we review AT&T Inc.’s proposed $39 billion acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc., under federal merger law, under the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and with a focus on possible remedies. We find, under a rule of law approach, that the proposed acquisition is presumptively anticompetitive, and the merging parties in their public disclosures have failed to overcome this presumption. Next we find that under the Merger Guidelines, there is reason to believe that the transaction may result in higher prices to consumers under several different plausible theories. Finally, we turn to the question of possible remedies. We conclude that there is a high likelihood that divestitures will not solve the competitive problems, and make the case for enjoining the acquisition.

Keywords: Clayton Act, merger, antitrust

JEL Classification: G34, K21, L40, L41, L43, L96

Suggested Citation

Grunes, Allen P. and Stucke, Maurice E., Antitrust Review of the AT&T/T-Mobile Transaction (May 18, 2011). Federal Communications Law Journal, Vol. 64, p. 47, 2011, University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 156, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1850103 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1850103

Allen P. Grunes

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP ( email )

1155 F Street, NW
Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20004
United States

Maurice E. Stucke (Contact Author)

University of Tennessee College of Law ( email )

1505 W. Cumberland Ave.
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States
865-974-9816 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mauricestucke.com

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