Voting Under the Threat of Secession: Accommodation vs. Repression

28 Pages Posted: 27 May 2011

See all articles by Vincent Anesi

Vincent Anesi

University of Nottingham

Philippe De Donder

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Date Written: May 2011

Abstract

We build a model of secession crises where voters may wish to accommodate the minority to prevent secession. We show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium with a government’s type biased in favor of the minority. We propose a measure of secession risk and perform the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium policy location and of the secession risk with respect to the cultural distinctiveness of the two regions, the relative weight attached by voters to economic factors, the relative size of the minority region, the probability that a secession attempt is successful, and the intra-regional heterogeneity of preferences.

Keywords: majority voting, secession risk, cultural distinctiveness, conflict, overlapping regional preferences

JEL Classification: D720, D740

Suggested Citation

Anesi, Vincent and De Donder, Philippe, Voting Under the Threat of Secession: Accommodation vs. Repression (May 2011). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3458, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1851307

Vincent Anesi

University of Nottingham ( email )

School of Economics, Room B18,
SCG, University of Nottingham
Nottingham, NG7 1GD
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://vincentanesi-economics.net/

Philippe De Donder (Contact Author)

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

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