Auditor Selection, Ownership and Governance Structure and Audit Fees: The French Case

36 Pages Posted: 30 May 2011

See all articles by Mehdi Nekhili

Mehdi Nekhili

Université du Maine; ICD International Business School; Université du Maine

Wafa Kammoun Masmoudi

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Dhikra Chebbi Nekhili

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: March 3, 2011

Abstract

Besides the size of the external auditor which is a major determinant, audit fees depend also on audit market characteristics, corporate governance and ownership. On the Basis of a sample of 130 French listed companies during the period 2004-2006, we present evidence of a « Big » auditor premium. The results highlight that the presence of a « Big » among auditors has a positive and significant effect of the level of audit fees. This impact is more important in the case of joint audit by two « Big » auditors. The choice of a « Major » auditor also increases the level of audit fees. Finally, we find that governance and ownership characteristics act in different ways on auditor’s selection involving complementarity or substitution with external audit.

Note: Downloadable document is in French.

Keywords: External auditor, Big Four, Majors, Audit fees, Governance, Ownership structure

JEL Classification: G30, M42

Suggested Citation

Nekhili, Mehdi and Masmoudi, Wafa Kammoun and Chebbi Nekhili, Dhikra, Auditor Selection, Ownership and Governance Structure and Audit Fees: The French Case (March 3, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1855510 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1855510

Mehdi Nekhili (Contact Author)

Université du Maine ( email )

72085 Le Mans Cedex 9
France

ICD International Business School

12 rue Alexandre Parodi
Paris, 75010
France

Université du Maine ( email )

72085 Le Mans Cedex 9
France

Wafa Kammoun Masmoudi

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Dhikra Chebbi Nekhili

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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