Labor Migration and the Case for Flat Tax

49 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2011

See all articles by Tomer Blumkin

Tomer Blumkin

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Efraim Sadka

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Yotam Shem-Tov

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

Date Written: May 31, 2011

Abstract

In this paper we employ a tax-competition model to demonstrate that in the presence of migration the re-distributive advantage of a non-linear income tax system over a linear (flat) one is significantly mitigated relative to the autarky (no-migration) equilibrium. When migration threats are sufficiently strong, a coordinated shift from a non-linear (prima-facie superior) system to a flat (inferior) regime is not too welfare-costly, even when the extent of re-distribution is significant. Therefore, such a shift may be warranted on administrative grounds. We also show, as expected, that migration reduces the extent of redistribution.

Keywords: flat tax, re-distribution, migration, tax-competition

JEL Classification: D600, H200, H500

Suggested Citation

Blumkin, Tomer and Sadka, Efraim and Shem-Tov, Yotam, Labor Migration and the Case for Flat Tax (May 31, 2011). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3471. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1855947

Tomer Blumkin (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2268 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Efraim Sadka

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 9712 (Phone)
+972 3 642 8074 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Yotam Shem-Tov

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

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