Adaptive Behavior in the European Parliament: Learning to Balance Competing Demands

Abstract

Parliamentary institutions and partisan norms are complex, and new members of parliament are unlikely to possess an innate awareness of optimal behavior. This paper examines how new legislators adopt the behavioral patterns of incumbent members in the 6th European Parliament. The 6th EP provides an excellent opportunity to study such adaptive behavior; in addition to newly elected members from EU15 states, new MEPs from ten accession countries took seats for the first time. We examine how voting behavior differs between new members from EU15 states, new members from accession countries, and incumbent members. Our analysis shows that new EU15 members defect less from their European political group than incumbents, while new accession country members defect more. Over time, the differences between these groups disappear.

Keywords: Legislative Politics, Comparative Politics, Comparative Legislatures, European Parliament, Roll Call Voting, Legislative Behavior, Political Economy, Adaptive Behavior, Learning, Principal-Agent Relationships

JEL Classification: C11, C15, D72, D83