New Evidence on Glass-Steagall and Its Impact on Future Legislation
41 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2011 Last revised: 26 Nov 2013
Date Written: November 25, 2013
I show that the effect of commercial bank entry into the underwriting market is dependent on whether the offering is shelf registered. Since virtually all public debt is shelf registered today, this provides new evidence on the extent to which prior findings are relevant in today’s capital markets. I find that commercial bank entry reduces fees only for non-shelf offerings. Entry reduces yields for both shelf and non-shelf offerings, but the effect is significantly larger for non-shelf offerings. I also find that bank-underwritten offerings have lower fees and higher yields for non-shelf offerings and lower yields for shelf offerings.
Keywords: Commercial Bank Underwriting, Dodd-Frank Act, Glass-Steagall Act, Public Debt Market, Shelf Registration, Underwriter Certification, Underwriter Competition
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