Feeling Right or Being Right: When Strong Assessment Yields Strong Correction

Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 316-324, 2010

Posted: 9 Jun 2011

See all articles by Kirstin C. Appelt

Kirstin C. Appelt

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business; Columbia University

Xi (Canny) Zou

London Business School

E. Tory Higgins

Columbia Business School - Management

Date Written: May 1, 2010

Abstract

Negotiators in regulatory fit report feeling right about an upcoming negotiation more than those in non-fit, and this intensifies their responses to negotiation preparation (Appelt, Zou, Arora, & Higgins, 2009). High assessors emphasize critical evaluation and being right (Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003). This emphasis should motivate them to engage in correction processes when they only feel right - so strongly as to produce elimination, and perhaps even overcorrection, of the fit effects found previously. We found that low assessors replicated regulatory fit effects on negotiation preparation measures of anticipated performance and perceived assessment competence. For high assessors, however, these fit effects were eliminated and even reversed to some extent. This is consistent with the prediction that high assessors correct because they want to be right, and not just feel right, and correcting can result in overcorrection. Implications for understanding the trade-offs of a strong assessment orientation are discussed.

Keywords: Negotiation, Regulatory Fit, Assessment, Correction, Regulatory Focus, Negotiator Role, Regulatory Mode

Suggested Citation

Appelt, Kirstin C. and Zou, Xi and Higgins, E. Tory, Feeling Right or Being Right: When Strong Assessment Yields Strong Correction (May 1, 2010). Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 316-324, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1860243

Kirstin C. Appelt (Contact Author)

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business ( email )

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Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Canada

Columbia University ( email )

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New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.kirstinappelt.com

Xi Zou

London Business School ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

E. Tory Higgins

Columbia Business School - Management ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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