Regulatory Fit in Negotiation: Effects of 'Prevention-Buyer' and 'Promotion-Seller' Fit

Social Cognition, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 365-384, 2009

Posted: 9 Jun 2011

See all articles by Kirstin C. Appelt

Kirstin C. Appelt

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business; Columbia University

Xi (Canny) Zou

London Business School

Poonam Arora

Columbia University

E. Tory Higgins

Columbia Business School - Management

Date Written: July 1, 2008

Abstract

We propose that the psychological effects of performing the buyer versus the seller role in a negotiation depend on regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000) with the demands of the role. When the negotiation emphasizes price, buyers want to pay only what is necessary (minimize monetary loss), which fits prevention focus concerns, whereas sellers want to attain as much money as possible (maximize monetary gain), which fits promotion focus concerns. Study 1 used a hypothetical price negotiation and found that planned demand was greater in the focus-role fit conditions (prevention-buyer; promotion-seller) than in the non-fit conditions. In Study 2, a real price negotiation, buyers adopted a non-loss/loss frame whereas sellers adopted a gain/non-gain frame. Negotiators in the focus-role fit conditions subjectively experienced fit, had more demanding opening offers, and, when paired with another negotiator in focus-role fit, impassed more often. Extensions and applications of focus-role fit are discussed.

Keywords: Negotiation, Regulatory Fit, Regulatory Focus, Role, Frame, Demand, Impasse

Suggested Citation

Appelt, Kirstin C. and Zou, Xi and Arora, Poonam and Higgins, E. Tory, Regulatory Fit in Negotiation: Effects of 'Prevention-Buyer' and 'Promotion-Seller' Fit (July 1, 2008). Social Cognition, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 365-384, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1860244

Kirstin C. Appelt (Contact Author)

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business ( email )

2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Canada

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.kirstinappelt.com

Xi Zou

London Business School ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Poonam Arora

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

E. Tory Higgins

Columbia Business School - Management ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
477
PlumX Metrics