Candidate Competition and Strategic Coordination: Evidence from Four Early Norwegian Elections
Electoral Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2003
Posted: 11 Jun 2011
Date Written: June 9, 2011
This article investigates strategic coordination in four elections to the Norwegian Storting (1909-18). The elections were held under a majority-plurality dual-ballot system, with unrestricted participation in the second-ballot. The focus is on elections with Conservative, Liberal and Labour candidates as main contenders. Supported by historical and theoretical arguments, the authors assume universally sincere voting in the first-ballot. Given this assumption, second-ballot elections can be analyzed as regular plurality elections. Hypotheses about behavior are formed using the game theoretic framework of Myerson and Weber (American Political Science Review 87 (1993) 102-114). It is found that while voters follow the predictions of theory fairly closely, the extent of coordination present at the candidate level can be questioned.
Keywords: Strategic Coordination, Runoff elections
JEL Classification: D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation