Candidate Competition and Strategic Coordination: Evidence from Four Early Norwegian Elections

Electoral Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2003

Posted: 11 Jun 2011

See all articles by Leif Helland

Leif Helland

BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics

Jo Saglie

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: June 9, 2011

Abstract

This article investigates strategic coordination in four elections to the Norwegian Storting (1909-18). The elections were held under a majority-plurality dual-ballot system, with unrestricted participation in the second-ballot. The focus is on elections with Conservative, Liberal and Labour candidates as main contenders. Supported by historical and theoretical arguments, the authors assume universally sincere voting in the first-ballot. Given this assumption, second-ballot elections can be analyzed as regular plurality elections. Hypotheses about behavior are formed using the game theoretic framework of Myerson and Weber (American Political Science Review 87 (1993) 102-114). It is found that while voters follow the predictions of theory fairly closely, the extent of coordination present at the candidate level can be questioned.

Keywords: Strategic Coordination, Runoff elections

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Helland, Leif and Saglie, Jo, Candidate Competition and Strategic Coordination: Evidence from Four Early Norwegian Elections (June 9, 2011). Electoral Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1860870

Leif Helland (Contact Author)

BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Nydalsveien 37
Oslo, 0484
Norway

Jo Saglie

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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