Can Exit Prizes Induce Lame Ducks to Shirk Less? Experimental Evidence

25 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2011

See all articles by Leif Helland

Leif Helland

BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics

Jon Hovi

University of Oslo - Department of Political Science

Lars C. Monkerud

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: February 10, 2011

Abstract

Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.

Keywords: Laboratory experiment, final period shrirking, majority assemblies

Suggested Citation

Helland, Leif and Hovi, Jon and Monkerud, Lars C., Can Exit Prizes Induce Lame Ducks to Shirk Less? Experimental Evidence (February 10, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1860873 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1860873

Leif Helland (Contact Author)

BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Nydalsveien 37
Oslo, 0484
Norway

Jon Hovi

University of Oslo - Department of Political Science ( email )

Eilert Sundts hus 7th floor
Moltke Moes vei 31
Oslo, 0851
Norway

Lars C. Monkerud

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
13
Abstract Views
439
PlumX Metrics