Learning to Throw Out the Rascals: Electoral Agency in the Lab
36 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2011
Date Written: November 2009
Models of electoral agency address the amount of discipline and selection that can be achieved by voters in elections. The models are demanding in terms of individual belief-formation and consistency of behavior. We investigate a baseline model of electoral agency in a controlled laboratory environment. This baseline model, although simple, form the core of more complex electoral agency models. Our design seeks to limit the behavioral impact of social preferences. We find little support for the baseline model in our data. However, simple (non-rational) learning rules explain behavioral patterns well. Simulations indicate that non-rational learning pushes behavior most forcefully towards equilibrium in situations that are favorable to bayesian updating.
Keywords: Laboratory experiment, Learning, Electoral Agency
JEL Classification: D72, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation