Peer Reporting and the Perception of Fairness

CentER Working Paper Series No. 2011-068

25 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2011

See all articles by Salima Douhou

Salima Douhou

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER)

J.R. Magnus

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics

Arthur van Soest

Tilburg University; Netspar; RAND Corporation; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Date Written: June 9, 2011

Abstract

Economic motives are not the only reasons for committing a (small) crime. People consider social norms and perceptions of fairness before judging a situation and acting upon it. If someone takes a bundle of printing paper from the office for private use at home, then a colleague who sees this can either report it or not: peer reporting. We investigate how fairness perception influences peer reporting in this situation of incorrect behavior.

Keywords: Peer reporting, Perception, Social norms, Fairness, Employee theft, Victimization

JEL Classification: C35, C36, D63, K42

Suggested Citation

Douhou, Salima and Magnus, Jan R. and van Soest, Arthur H. O., Peer Reporting and the Perception of Fairness (June 9, 2011). CentER Working Paper Series No. 2011-068. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1861167 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1861167

Salima Douhou

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
0031134662824 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.center.nl

Jan R. Magnus (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Arthur H. O. van Soest

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands

Netspar

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

RAND Corporation ( email )

P.O. Box 2138
1776 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
United States

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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