An Empirical Examination of Conference Calls as a Voluntary Disclosure Medium

Posted: 16 Nov 1999

See all articles by Richard M. Frankel

Richard M. Frankel

Washington University in Saint Louis - Olin Business School

Marilyn F. Johnson

Michigan State University - Department of Accounting & Information Systems

Douglas J. Skinner

The University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract

Corporate conference calls are large-scale telephone conference calls during which managers make presentations to and answer questions from various market participants, usually about earnings. In this paper, we sample 1,056 corporate conference calls made by 808 firms during February-November 1995 to provide evidence on three questions: (1) whether conference calls provide information to stock market participants, (2) whether investors have equal access to the information provided during these calls, and (3) why managers of some firms hold conference calls while managers of other firms do not. We believe this research is important because managers? use of conference calls has grown enormously, yet we know little about how these calls affect investors.

JEL Classification: M41, M45, G14

Suggested Citation

Frankel, Richard M. and Johnson, Marilyn F. and Skinner, Douglas J., An Empirical Examination of Conference Calls as a Voluntary Disclosure Medium. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=186130

Richard M. Frankel

Washington University in Saint Louis - Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

Marilyn F. Johnson

Michigan State University - Department of Accounting & Information Systems ( email )

270 North Business Complex
East Lansing, MI 48824-1034
United States
517-432-0152 (Phone)
517-432-1101 (Fax)

Douglas J. Skinner (Contact Author)

The University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7137 (Phone)

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