Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions

66 Pages Posted: 12 Apr 2007 Last revised: 8 Mar 2013

See all articles by Holger Daske

Holger Daske

University of Mannheim

Luzi Hail

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Christian Leuz

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Leibniz Institute SAFE; CESifo Research Network; Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Rodrigo S. Verdi

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 8, 2013

Abstract

This study examines liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm-level heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standards. Some firms may make very few changes and adopt IAS/IFRS more in name, while for others the change in standards could be part of a strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. To test these predictions, we classify firms into ‘label’ and ‘serious’ adopters using firm-level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behavior, and the external reporting environment around the switch to IAS/IFRS. We analyze whether capital-market effects are different across ‘serious’ and ‘label’ firms. While on average liquidity and costs of capital often do not change around voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions, we find considerable heterogeneity: ‘Serious’ adoptions are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in cost of capital, whereas ‘label’ adoptions are not. We obtain similar results when classifying firms around mandatory IFRS adoption. Our findings imply that we have to exercise caution when interpreting capital-market effects around IAS/IFRS adoption as they also reflect changes in reporting incentives or broader changes in firms’ reporting strategies, and not just the standards.

Keywords: International accounting, Reporting incentives, IAS, U.S. GAAP, Disclosure, Cost of equity, IFRS implementation

JEL Classification: G14, G15, G30, K22, M41, M42

Suggested Citation

Daske, Holger and Hail, Luzi and Leuz, Christian and Verdi, Rodrigo S., Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions (January 8, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1864771 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1864771

Holger Daske

University of Mannheim ( email )

Mannheim, 68131
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/en/daske/

Luzi Hail (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Christian Leuz

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.leuz/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Leibniz Institute SAFE ( email )

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CESifo Research Network

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Rodrigo S. Verdi

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

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