The Determinants of Audit Committee Independence and Activity: Evidence from the UK

13 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2011

See all articles by Basil Al‐Najjar

Basil Al‐Najjar

University of London - School of Business, Economics and Informatics

Date Written: July 2011

Abstract

We investigate the determinants of audit committee independence and activity in UK firms. We employ panel data analysis for non‐financial films that provide the required information for the period from 2003 to 2008. Our findings show that audit committees are more independent when firms have large boards and more insider ownership. In addition, we detect that large firms place less demand on audit independence. This study also provides new evidence that firms with more free cash flows require more audit independence. Finally, firms with large audit committees and large boards that meet more frequently are active and demand more audit committee meetings.

Keywords: Agency theory, audit committee, corporate governance

Suggested Citation

Al-Najjar, Basil, The Determinants of Audit Committee Independence and Activity: Evidence from the UK (July 2011). International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 15, Issue 2, pp. 191-203, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1865066 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1099-1123.2011.00429.x

Basil Al-Najjar (Contact Author)

University of London - School of Business, Economics and Informatics ( email )

Malet Street
Bloomsbury
London, WC1E 7HX
United Kingdom

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