The Choice of Different Types of Subjectivity in CEO Annual Bonus Contracts

46 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2011

See all articles by Felix Hoppe

Felix Hoppe

Maastricht University - School of Business and Economics

Frank Moers

Maastricht University School of Business and Economics; European Centre for Corporate Engagement (ECCE)

Date Written: June 16, 2011

Abstract

In assessing the performance of the CEO, subjectivity by the board of directors is often present in one form or another. We specifically focus on: (1) the ex ante option to ex post override a formula-based contract (“discretionary bonus”), and (2) the ex ante absence of any formula in a contract (“subjective weights”). We argue that the two types of deviations are driven by different contracting problems, which relate to whether post-contract information does or does not affect the agent’s optimal action choice. We refer to these different contracting problems as problems of risk and problems of noncongruity, respectively, and hypothesize that discretionary bonuses are used for risk reduction purposes, while subjective weights on different performance dimensions are used for congruity improvement purposes. Our results are consistent with our expectations, showing that the use of the different types of subjectivity is consistent with optimal contracting considerations.

Keywords: discretion, optimal contracting, bonus contracts, corporate governance

JEL Classification: J33, M40, M52

Suggested Citation

Hoppe, Felix and Moers, Frank, The Choice of Different Types of Subjectivity in CEO Annual Bonus Contracts (June 16, 2011). Accounting Review, Vol. 86, No. 6, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1865967

Felix Hoppe

Maastricht University - School of Business and Economics ( email )

Maastricht
+31 43 388 3674 (Phone)

Frank Moers (Contact Author)

Maastricht University School of Business and Economics ( email )

Maastricht

HOME PAGE: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/sbe

European Centre for Corporate Engagement (ECCE) ( email )

Tongersestraat 53
Maastricht, 6211LM
Netherlands

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