The Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement: Quod Dei Deo, Quod Caesaris Caesari

Abstract

The paper addresses the position of private enforcement in the overall context of competition enforcement in Europe and its relationship with public enforcement. It revisits the various objectives-functions served by competition enforcement (injunctive, compensatory, deterrent-punitive) and considers how and to what extent there is a role of each limb of antitrust enforcement with regard to such objectives-functions. It then sets out the principle that private enforcement is independent of public enforcement and places emphasis on the questions of the effect of public decisions on private litigation and on the interaction between the latter and leniency. Finally, the paper reviews the role of public agencies in quantifying anti-competitive harm and takes a position as to the degree such a duty should be imposed on them.

Keywords: antitrust, EU competition law, private enforcement, public enforcement, harm

JEL Classification: K21, K13