Formalism, Realism, and Patent Scope

IP Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 88-99, 2010

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-30

13 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2011  

Tun-Jen Chiang

George Mason University School of Law

Abstract

Much recent literature has characterized the Federal Circuit’s patent scope jurisprudence as “formalistic.” Another extensive set of literature has characterized the Federal Circuit’s patent scope jurisprudence as wildly indeterministic. If formalism is defined as decision-making according to predictable rules, then these two claims contradict each other.

In this Essay, I argue that the Federal Circuit is not a formalistic court in practice, though like every other court it uses formalistic rhetoric. But such rhetoric only masks the reality that current patent scope doctrines allow an enormous amount of judicial discretion; discretion that the Federal Circuit has pragmatically exercised.

Keywords: CCPA, Court of Appeals, Customs Appeals, extra-legal tools, generalist judges, incentives, Jeffrey Lefstin, later-arising technology, legal, logic, Peter Lee, policy balancing, precedent, Richard Nelson, Robert P. Merges, Ronald Dworkin, rules, self-contained discipline, sub rosa, trademark, USPTO

JEL Classification: K11, O34

Suggested Citation

Chiang, Tun-Jen, Formalism, Realism, and Patent Scope. IP Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 88-99, 2010; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-30. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1871148

Tun-Jen Chiang (Contact Author)

George Mason University School of Law ( email )

Paper statistics

Downloads
75
Rank
267,098
Abstract Views
881