The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change

31 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2011 Last revised: 3 Oct 2011

See all articles by Dan M. Kahan

Dan M. Kahan

Yale Law School

Maggie Wittlin

Fordham University School of Law

Ellen Peters

Ohio State University - Psychology Department; Decision Research; University of Oregon

Paul Slovic

Decision Research; University of Oregon - Department of Psychology

Lisa Larrimore Ouellette

Stanford Law School

Donald Braman

George Washington University - Law School; Justice Innovation Lab

Gregory N. Mandel

Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

The conventional explanation for controversy over climate change emphasizes impediments to public understanding: Limited popular knowledge of science, the inability of ordinary citizens to assess technical information, and the resulting widespread use of unreliable cognitive heuristics to assess risk. A large survey of U.S. adults (N = 1540) found little support for this account. On the whole, the most scientifically literate and numerate subjects were slightly less likely, not more, to see climate change as a serious threat than the least scientifically literate and numerate ones. More importantly, greater scientific literacy and numeracy were associated with greater cultural polarization: Respondents predisposed by their values to dismiss climate change evidence became more dismissive, and those predisposed by their values to credit such evidence more concerned, as science literacy and numeracy increased. We suggest that this evidence reflects a conflict between two levels of rationality: The individual level, which is characterized by citizens’ effective use of their knowledge and reasoning capacities to form risk perceptions that express their cultural commitments; and the collective level, which is characterized by citizens’ failure to converge on the best available scientific evidence on how to promote their common welfare. Dispelling this, “tragedy of the risk-perception commons,” we argue, should be understood as the central aim of the science of science communication.

Suggested Citation

Kahan, Dan M. and Wittlin, Maggie and Peters, Ellen and Slovic, Paul and Ouellette, Lisa Larrimore and Braman, Donald and Mandel, Gregory, The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change (2011). Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-26, Cultural Cognition Project Working Paper No. 89, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 435, Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 230, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1871503 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1871503

Dan M. Kahan (Contact Author)

Yale Law School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.culturalcognition.net/kahan

Maggie Wittlin

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

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Ellen Peters

Ohio State University - Psychology Department ( email )

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Decision Research ( email )

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University of Oregon ( email )

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Paul Slovic

Decision Research ( email )

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Eugene, OR 97401
United States
541-485-2400 (Phone)
541-485-2403 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.decisionresearch.org

University of Oregon - Department of Psychology ( email )

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United States
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Lisa Larrimore Ouellette

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.stanford.edu/directory/lisa-larrimore-ouellette/

Donald Braman

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
2025034132 (Phone)

Justice Innovation Lab ( email )

Gregory Mandel

Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law ( email )

1719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
(215) 204-2381 (Phone)

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