Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes

46 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2011

See all articles by John M. de Figueiredo

John M. de Figueiredo

Duke University School of Law; Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

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Date Written: June 2011

Abstract

The literature on congressional committees has largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional fights on policy proposals and outcomes. This paper develops a theory of how legislators balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes. It shows why a) senior members and young members in safe districts are most likely to challenge a committee's jurisdiction; b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer's ideal point in order to obtain jurisdiction; c) policy outcomes will generally be more moderate with jurisdictional fights than without these turf wars. We empirically investigate these results examining proposed Internet intellectual property protection legislation in the 106th Congress.

Suggested Citation

de Figueiredo, John M., Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes (June 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17171. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1872310

John M. De Figueiredo (Contact Author)

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