Deception and False Expectations

Posted: 27 Jun 2011

See all articles by Lukas Koning

Lukas Koning

Leiden University

Wolfgang Steinel

Leiden University - Social and Organizational Psychology

Ilja van Beest

Tilburg University

Eric van Dijk

Leiden University

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

Deception is a common bargaining tactic that has also often been described as a form of unethical behavior. One reason why deception could be considered unethical is that it may evoke false expectations in others. In the current article we investigated false expectations that may be raised by using deception in an ultimatum bargaining setting. In particular, we investigated whether lying about your own outcomes is evaluated differently than lying about the outcomes of another party. In two experiments, we demonstrated that people judge a lying opponent less harshly when he or she lied about his own outcomes instead of the outcomes of another party. In addition, in our third experiment we demonstrate that people prefer are more likely to lie about their own outcomes than about those of another party.

Suggested Citation

Koning, Lukas and Steinel, Wolfgang and van Beest, Ilja and van Dijk, Eric, Deception and False Expectations (2011). IACM 24th Annual Conference Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1872904 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1872904

Lukas Koning (Contact Author)

Leiden University ( email )

Postbus 9500
Leiden, 2300 RA
Netherlands

Wolfgang Steinel

Leiden University - Social and Organizational Psychology ( email )

Leiden, 2300 RA
Netherlands

Ilja van Beest

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands

Eric van Dijk

Leiden University ( email )

Postbus 9500
Leiden, 2300 RA
Netherlands

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