Institutional Transition and the Problem of Credible Commitment

ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, p. 41, Emily Chamlee-Wright, ed., Beloit College, 2009

11 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2011 Last revised: 7 Oct 2011

See all articles by Peter J. Boettke

Peter J. Boettke

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 27, 2011

Abstract

During the last phase of state socialism, the economic reforms attempted by these counties didn’t stop the collapse of communism. Neither did the free market economic reforms in the democratic West starting around 1975 bring progress and prosperity expected. The frustrations of both these attempts of transformation make it clear that the goal of social transition would not be achieved without liberal limits on the state - what was created to ward off private predation, which itself became a greater problem of predation. Indeed, we can only ensure the effective function of the society by establishing the self-sustaining constitution and enforcing credible commitment that bind the public institutions.

JEL Classification: O10

Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J., Institutional Transition and the Problem of Credible Commitment (June 27, 2011). ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, p. 41, Emily Chamlee-Wright, ed., Beloit College, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1873150

Peter J. Boettke (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)

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