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An Economic Approach to Price Fixing

96 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2011 Last revised: 8 Jan 2015

Louis Kaplow

Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: May 1, 2011

Abstract

This article examines optimal policy toward coordinated oligopolistic price elevation. First, it analyzes the social welfare implications of enforcement, elaborating the value of deterrence and the nature of possible chilling effects. Then, it explores a variety of means of detection, with particular attention to the sorts of errors that may arise under each. Finally, it examines the level and type of sanctions that should be employed. It emerges that there is remarkably little overlap in content between the present investigation and prior legal policy work on the subject. Some central issues have been ignored while particular resolutions of others have been taken for granted, thereby indicating the need for wholesale reassessment.

JEL Classification: D43, K21, L13, L41

Suggested Citation

Kaplow, Louis, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing (May 1, 2011). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 694. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1873412 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1873412

Louis Kaplow (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/facdir.php?id=32&show=bibliography

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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