Corporate Governance and Transparency in Japan

67 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2011 Last revised: 13 Nov 2018

See all articles by Hiroyuki Aman

Hiroyuki Aman

Kwansei Gakuin University

Wendy Beekes

Lancaster University - Department of Accounting and Finance

Philip R. Brown

UWA Business School, M250; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Date Written: November 13, 2018

Abstract

We examine whether better-governed, listed Japanese firms are more transparent to their shareholders. We use governance ratings compiled by the Nikkei Corporate Governance Evaluation System to measure corporate governance. For a sample of Tokyo Stock Exchange First Section firms between 2003 and 2013, we examine whether corporate governance quality is associated with firm’s transparency. Compared with firms with weaker governance, we find that better-governed firms make more frequent public disclosures, their disclosures of good news are timelier, and their share prices reflect good news faster. However, we did not detect comparable effects for bad news, which has implications for regulators.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Transparency; Disclosures; Price Discovery; Timeliness.

JEL Classification: C26, G34, G39

Suggested Citation

Aman, Hiroyuki and Beekes, Wendy and Brown, Philip R., Corporate Governance and Transparency in Japan (November 13, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1874611 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1874611

Hiroyuki Aman

Kwansei Gakuin University ( email )

Uegahara
Nishinomiya, Hyogo 662-8501
Japan
+81-798-54-6343 (Phone)

Wendy Beekes (Contact Author)

Lancaster University - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom
++44 (0)1524 593623 (Phone)

Philip R. Brown

UWA Business School, M250 ( email )

Crawley, Western Australia 6009
Australia

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

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