Corporate Governance and Transparency in Japan

31 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2011 Last revised: 7 Aug 2020

See all articles by Hiroyuki Aman

Hiroyuki Aman

Kwansei Gakuin University

Wendy Beekes

Lancaster University - Department of Accounting and Finance

Philip R. Brown

UWA Business School, M250; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Date Written: August 5, 2020

Abstract

Corporate governance (CG) reformists typically presume better-governed companies are more transparent to investors. We focus on CG and transparency in Japan, where CG has been an ongoing issue. Using local ratings of Japanese companies’ CG, and data on corporate disclosures and their associated stock returns, we do find better-governed Japanese companies have made more frequent and timelier disclosures, and that their share prices have reflected value-relevant information earlier. While these results hold for good news, they do not hold for bad. Consequently, governance guidance in Japan may not have resulted in both timelier and more balanced release of newsworthy information.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Transparency; Disclosures; Price Discovery; Timeliness

JEL Classification: C26; G34; G39

Suggested Citation

Aman, Hiroyuki and Beekes, Wendy and Brown, Philip R., Corporate Governance and Transparency in Japan (August 5, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1874611 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1874611

Hiroyuki Aman

Kwansei Gakuin University ( email )

Uegahara
Nishinomiya, Hyogo 662-8501
Japan
+81-798-54-6343 (Phone)

Wendy Beekes (Contact Author)

Lancaster University - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

Philip R. Brown

UWA Business School, M250 ( email )

Crawley, Western Australia 6009
Australia

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

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