Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1875682
 
 

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The International Politics of IFRS Harmonization


Karthik Ramanna


Harvard University - Harvard Business School; University of Oxford - Blavatnik School of Government

August 27, 2012

Accounting, Economics and Law 3, No. 2 (April 2013)
Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 11-132

Abstract:     
The globalization of accounting standards as seen through the proliferation of IFRS worldwide is one of the most important developments in corporate governance over the last decade. I offer an analysis of some international political dynamics of countries’ IFRS harmonization decisions. The analysis is based on field studies in three jurisdictions: Canada, China, and India. Across these jurisdictions, I first describe unique elements of domestic political economies that are shaping IFRS policies. Then, I inductively isolate two principal dimensions that can be used to characterize the jurisdictions’ IFRS responses: proximity to existing political powers at the IASB; and own potential political power at the IASB. Based on how countries are classified along these dimensions, I offer predictions, ceteris paribus, on countries’ IFRS harmonization strategies. The analysis and framework in this paper can help broaden the understanding of accounting’s globalization.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: accounting standards, globalization, IASB, IFRS, politics

JEL Classification: D72, F53, G15, K33, M16, M41


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Date posted: July 2, 2011 ; Last revised: May 8, 2013

Suggested Citation

Ramanna, Karthik, The International Politics of IFRS Harmonization (August 27, 2012). Accounting, Economics and Law 3, No. 2 (April 2013); Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 11-132. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1875682 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1875682

Contact Information

Karthik Ramanna (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Business School ( email )
Boston, MA 02163
United States

University of Oxford - Blavatnik School of Government ( email )
10 Merton St
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4JJ
United Kingdom
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