Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Forthcoming 2012

41 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2011 Last revised: 16 Jul 2012

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Marian Gili Saldaña

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Fernando Gomez-Pomar

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2, 2011

Abstract

This paper develops an empirical analysis of judicial behavior in the Spanish Supreme Court, a court of law dominated by career judiciary. We focus on administrative review. The evidence seems to confirm that a career judiciary is not strongly politically aligned and favors consensus, formalism and dissent avoidance. Notwithstanding, we detect a significant relationship between the decisions of the Court and the interest of the government. We suggest that our empirical analysis makes a significant contribution to undermine the myth of political insulation by career judges. Unlike previous literature, however, we argue and show that judicial politicization can be consistent with consensus and dissent avoidance.

Keywords: judges, comparative law, civil law, law and politics

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno and Gili Saldaña, Marian and Gomez-Pomar, Fernando, Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court (July 2, 2011). Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Forthcoming 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1877083 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1877083

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Marian Gili Saldaña

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain

Fernando Gomez-Pomar

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
08005 Barcelona
Spain
(34-93) 542 16 47 (Phone)
(34-93) 542 17 31 (Fax)

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