Governing the Post-Socialist Transitional Commons: A Case from Rural China
24 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 115 (2012), reprinted in 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS CONF. J. 303 (2012).
46 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2011 Last revised: 12 Feb 2014
Date Written: November 8, 2011
When the collective declines, who manages the collective-owned land? When the socialist state fails, who possesses the state-owned river? This Article concerns the governance of land and natural resources that are still owned by collectives or the state in rural China. No effective community governance has evolved in rural China to fill the authority vacuum left by the dissolution of the people’s commune system. As a result, such land and natural resources have become real commons. In describing these I use the term “transitional commons” to indicate both the crucial influence of the transitional political legal environment in their emergence and evolution and their inherently transitional character. Transitional commons are often in crisis. The tragedy of the commons occurs when the cost of exclusive use is too high. When the benefit of exclusive use exceeds the cost, competing property claims arise over the common resources. I argue for an integrated approach to govern the transitional commons from the ground. Successful management of the transitional commons requires more than choosing the right property institution. A capable state and a well-functioning community are necessary to make the property institution, whichever it is, work. Rule of law is necessary to define the basic structure of a society and to guarantee the normal operation of the community self-governance. Self- governance can increase social capital for the local community to develop local consensus on property arrangements.
Keywords: transitional commons, rural China, property rights
JEL Classification: K11, K32, K42, Q24, Q25
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation