Perfect Competition: A Case of Market-Failure

Corporate Ownership & Control, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2005

7 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2011

See all articles by William Barnett

William Barnett

Loyola University New Orleans

Walter E. Block

Loyola University New Orleans - Joseph A. Butt, S.J. College of Business

Michael Saliba

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract

In this paper we research one of the corporate governance mechanisms, i.e, market for goods and services. We focus on perfect competition. We concluded with the explicit argument for letting loose the dogs of the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department upon perfect competitors. Our main concern is the failure of mainstream economics to incorporate, properly and completely, the concept of foregone alternatives, into its analysis. The present paper is an attempt to trace out the some of the implications of this critical error for industrial organization.

Suggested Citation

Barnett, William and Block, Walter E. and Saliba, Michael, Perfect Competition: A Case of Market-Failure. Corporate Ownership & Control, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1880106

William Barnett

Loyola University New Orleans ( email )

526 Pine Street
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

Walter E. Block (Contact Author)

Loyola University New Orleans - Joseph A. Butt, S.J. College of Business ( email )

6363 St. Charles Avenue
Box 15, Miller 321
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States
(504) 864-7944 (Phone)
(504) 864-7970 (Fax)

Michael Saliba

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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