Constitutional Economics and the Calculus of Consent

Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 37-56, Summer 2001

20 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2011

See all articles by Walter E. Block

Walter E. Block

Loyola University New Orleans - Joseph A. Butt, S.J. College of Business

Thomas DiLorenzo

Loyola University Maryland - The Joseph A. Sellinger, S.J. School of Business and Management

Date Written: July 6, 2011

Abstract

James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock are widely credited with creating the Public Choice School. Its main elements include constitutional political economy, an analysis of different voting-rights regimes, and the insight that human beings do not suddenly sprout angel’s wings when they become government bureaucrats (hence, there is government failure as well as market failure). The latter is devoted to an investigation of the premises upon which a legitimate government is predicated, and to an understanding of human and property rights in a constitutional democratic order. In this paper, public choice constitutional economics shall be subjected to critique.

Suggested Citation

Block, Walter E. and DiLorenzo, Thomas, Constitutional Economics and the Calculus of Consent (July 6, 2011). Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 37-56, Summer 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1880186

Walter E. Block (Contact Author)

Loyola University New Orleans - Joseph A. Butt, S.J. College of Business ( email )

6363 St. Charles Avenue
Box 15, Miller 321
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States
(504) 864-7944 (Phone)
(504) 864-7970 (Fax)

Thomas DiLorenzo

Loyola University Maryland - The Joseph A. Sellinger, S.J. School of Business and Management ( email )

Baltimore, MD 21210
United States

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