Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 156, No. 4, 2000
9 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2011
Date Written: July 6, 2011
According to public choice theory, the market and the state are both devices through which cooperation is organized and made possible. This theme of voluntary government is most prevalent in the subset of public choice known as constitutional economics. We believe that the analogy between politics and markets made by constitutional economists is theoretically weak and clouds rather than enhances our understanding of political economy. Politics has very little in common with non-coercive, voluntary exchange in the marketplace.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Block, Walter E. and DiLorenzo, Thomas, Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics (July 6, 2011). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 156, No. 4, 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1880189