Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 156, No. 4, 2000

9 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2011  

Walter E. Block

Loyola University New Orleans - Joseph A. Butt, S.J. College of Business

Thomas DiLorenzo

Loyola University Maryland - The Joseph A. Sellinger, S.J. School of Business and Management

Date Written: July 6, 2011

Abstract

According to public choice theory, the market and the state are both devices through which cooperation is organized and made possible. This theme of voluntary government is most prevalent in the subset of public choice known as constitutional economics. We believe that the analogy between politics and markets made by constitutional economists is theoretically weak and clouds rather than enhances our understanding of political economy. Politics has very little in common with non-coercive, voluntary exchange in the marketplace.

Suggested Citation

Block, Walter E. and DiLorenzo, Thomas, Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics (July 6, 2011). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 156, No. 4, 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1880189

Walter E. Block (Contact Author)

Loyola University New Orleans - Joseph A. Butt, S.J. College of Business ( email )

6363 St. Charles Avenue
Box 15, Miller 321
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States
(504) 864-7944 (Phone)
(504) 864-7970 (Fax)

Thomas DiLorenzo

Loyola University Maryland - The Joseph A. Sellinger, S.J. School of Business and Management ( email )

Baltimore, MD 21210
United States

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