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Evolutionarily Stable In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Spite in Intergroup Conflict

22 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2011 Last revised: 2 Jan 2012

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Florian Morath

Goethe University Frankfurt; Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Date Written: July 2011

Abstract

We study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and find that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.

Keywords: altruism, spite, in-group favoritism, conflict, evolutionary stability, indirect evolutionary approach

JEL Classification: C72, D03, D64, D74

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Morath, Florian, Evolutionarily Stable In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Spite in Intergroup Conflict (July 2011). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2011-07. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1881550 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1881550

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
Berlin, 10785
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wzb.eu/mp/fff/people/kai_konrad.en.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Florian Morath

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Gr√ľneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

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