Benefactors and Beneficiaries: The Effects of Giving and Receiving on Cost-Coalitional Problems

32 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2011 Last revised: 4 Jun 2013

See all articles by Ana Meca

Ana Meca

Miguel Hernandez University

Greys Sosic

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Date Written: June 4, 2013

Abstract

We introduce a class of cost-coalitional problems, which are based on a-priori information about the cost faced by each agent in each set that it could belong to. Our focus is on problems with decreasingly monotonic coalitional costs. In this class of problems, we study the effects of giving and receiving when there exist players whose participation in an alliance always contributes to the savings of all alliance members (we refer to these players as benefactors), and there also exist players whose cost decrease in such an alliance (we call them beneficiaries). We use linear and quadratic norm cost games to analyze the role played by benefactors and beneficiaries in achieving stability of different cooperating alliances. We consider different notions of stability (the core and the bargaining set), and provide conditions for stability of an all-inclusive alliance of agents which leads to minimum value of total cost incurred by all agents.

Keywords: cost-coalitional problems, cooperation, benefactors, beneficiaries, k-norm cost games, stability, cost-reducing

Suggested Citation

Meca, Ana and Sosic, Greys, Benefactors and Beneficiaries: The Effects of Giving and Receiving on Cost-Coalitional Problems (June 4, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1882005 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1882005

Ana Meca

Miguel Hernandez University ( email )

Elche Campus, La Galia Building
Avda. del Ferrocarril, s/n
03202 Elche
Spain

Greys Sosic (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

Bridge Hall 308
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

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