Paying a Price: Culture, Trust, and Negotiation Consequences

Journal of Applied Psychology, Forthcoming

51 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2011

Date Written: July 11, 2011

Abstract

Three studies contrasting Indian and American negotiators tested hypotheses derived from theory proposing why there are cultural differences in trust and how cultural differences in trust influence negotiation strategy. Study 1 (a survey) documented that Indian negotiators trust their counterparts less than American negotiators. Study 2 (a negotiation simulation) linked American and Indian negotiators’ self-reported trust and strategy to their insight and joint gains. Study 3 replicated and extended Study 2 using independently coded negotiation strategy data, allowing for stronger causal inference. Overall, the strategy associated with Indian negotiators’ reluctance to extend interpersonal (as opposed to institutional) trust produced relatively poor outcomes. Our data support an expanded theoretical model of negotiation, linking culture to trust, strategies, and outcomes.

Keywords: culture, trust, negotiation strategy, Indian and U.S. negotiators

Suggested Citation

Gunia, Brian and Brett, Jeanne M. and Nandkeolyar, Amit and Kamdar, Dishan, Paying a Price: Culture, Trust, and Negotiation Consequences (July 11, 2011). Journal of Applied Psychology, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1883450

Brian Gunia

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Jeanne M. Brett

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-8075 (Phone)
847-491-8896 (Fax)

Amit Nandkeolyar (Contact Author)

Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad ( email )

Hyderabad, Gachibowli 500 019
India

Dishan Kamdar

Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad ( email )

Hyderabad, Gachibowli 500 019
India

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