Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Committee Experiments

12 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2011

See all articles by Catherine C. Eckel

Catherine C. Eckel

Texas A&M University

Charles A. Holt

University of Virginia - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 1, 1989

Abstract

This paper reports results of committee voting experiments in which a fixed agenda specifies a sequence of binary decisions. The outcome depends on whether voting is myopic or strategic. Subjects initially voted in accordance with myopic-voting rules; strategic-voting behavior was more prevalent with experience. The use of the same induced preferences in successive meetings was more likely to induce strategic voting than the provision of public information concerning the numbers of voters of each preference type.

Suggested Citation

Eckel, Catherine C. and Holt, Charles A., Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Committee Experiments (September 1, 1989). American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 4, p. 763, 1989, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1883610

Catherine C. Eckel (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University ( email )

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College Station, TX 77843-4228
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Charles A. Holt

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 400182
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Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States
(804) 924-7894 (Phone)

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