Patent ‘Trolls’: Rent-Seeking Parasites or Innovation-Facilitating Middlemen?

18 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2011  

Shawn P. Miller

Stanford Law School

Date Written: April 26, 2010

Abstract

Non-practicing entities (NPEs), a.k.a. patent "trolls", have been disparaged as wasteful rent-seekers who assert patents that are credible as litigation weapons but weak in innovative value. Others, however, view NPEs as beneficial middlemen between capital-constrained inventors and technology producers. In this paper I analyze the characteristics of NPE-litigated patents and NPE litigation opponents. I find evidence that supports both the negative and positive view of NPEs: NPEs do litigate broader patents in complex technologies consistent with the hold-up theory of NPE patent litigation. However, consistent with the view they are beneficial middlemen, NPEs are more likely than practicing firms to assert patents originally obtained by individuals or foreign inventors.

Keywords: Patent, Litigation, NPE

JEL Classification: K41, O34

Suggested Citation

Miller, Shawn P., Patent ‘Trolls’: Rent-Seeking Parasites or Innovation-Facilitating Middlemen? (April 26, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1885538 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1885538

Shawn Patrick Miller (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
232
Rank
107,240
Abstract Views
846