Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games

22 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2011

See all articles by Andrea Attar

Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics; University of Roma Tor Vergata

Eloisa Campioni

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance

Gwenael Piaser

Universite du Luxembourg

Date Written: July 14, 2011

Abstract

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. In this context, we identify a class of direct and incentive compatible mechanisms: each principal privately recommends to each agent to reveal her private information to the other principals, and each agent behaves truthfully. We show that there is a rationale in restricting attention to this class of mechanisms: if all principals make use of direct incentive compatible mechanisms, there are no incentives to unilaterally deviate towards more sophisticated mechanisms. We develop two examples to show that private recommendations are a key element of our construction, and that the restriction to direct incentive compatible mechanisms is not sufficient to provide a complete characterization of equilibria.

Keywords: incomplete information, competing mechanisms, information revelation

JEL Classification: D82

Suggested Citation

Attar, Andrea and Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenael, Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games (July 14, 2011). CEIS Working Paper No. 205. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1885606 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1885606

Andrea Attar (Contact Author)

Toulouse School of Economics

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Toulouse, F 31000
France
+33 5 61128578 (Phone)

University of Roma Tor Vergata ( email )

2 Via Columbia
00100 Rome
Italy

Eloisa Campioni

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance ( email )

Italy

Gwenael Piaser

Universite du Luxembourg ( email )

148, avenue de la Faïencerie
Luxembourg, L-1511
Luxembourg
+ 352 46 66 44 6811 (Fax)

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