Intrinsic Work Motivation and Pension Reform Acceptance

33 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2011

See all articles by Friedrich Heinemann

Friedrich Heinemann

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research; University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics

Tanja Hennighausen

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Marc-Daniel Moessinger

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

Although demographic change leaves pay-as-you-go pension systems unsustainable, reforms, such as a higher pension age, are highly unpopular. This contribution looks into the role of intrinsic motivation as a driver for pension reform acceptance. Theoretical reasoning suggests that this driver should be relevant: The choice among different pension reform options (increasing pension age, increasing contributions, cutting pensions) can be analyzed within the framework of an optimal job separation decision. In this optimization, intrinsic job satisfaction matters as it decreases the subjective costs of a higher pension age. We test this key hypothesis on the basis of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). The results are unambiguous: In addition to factors such as age or education, the inclusion of intrinsic work motivation helps to improve our prediction of an individual’s reform orientation. Our results are of importance for reform acceptance beyond the specific topic of pension reform. They point to the fact that the support for welfare state reform is also decided at the workplace.

Keywords: Pension System, Reforms, Pension Age, ALLBUS

JEL Classification: D78, H55, H31

Suggested Citation

Heinemann, Friedrich and Hennighausen, Tanja and Moessinger, Marc-Daniel, Intrinsic Work Motivation and Pension Reform Acceptance (2011). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 11-045, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1886425 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1886425

Friedrich Heinemann (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.zew.de

University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany

Tanja Hennighausen

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

L 7, 3-5
D-68131 Mannheim
Germany
+49 6211811818 (Phone)
+49 6211811814 (Fax)

Marc-Daniel Moessinger

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

L7,1
Mannheim, DE 68161
Germany
+49 621 1235 161 (Phone)
+49 621 1235 223 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.zew.de/en/mitarbeiter/mitarbeiter.php3?action=mita&kurz=mdm

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