The Privatization of Military and Security Services and the Limits of Contract: Lessons from the US

EUI Working Papers MWP 2010/31 - Max Weber Programme

33 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2011

See all articles by Valentina Calderai

Valentina Calderai

University of Pisa, Faculty of Economics

Date Written: July 17, 2011

Abstract

A consistent body of literature has focused in recent years on the potentialities for market mechanisms to improve the enforcement of international human rights law against the breaches committed by private military and security companies (“PMSCs”) employed by sovereign entities. Yet, of all the avenues known by the law of contract to increase the degree of compliance with international law, none is ever included in the contracts between PMSCs and their major sovereign customers.

This paper gives an account of this reluctancy on the part of the States, based on a survey of the contracts concluded by the U.S. administration during the first stage of the Iraq occupation and the comparative analysis of public and private organizations. In contrast to domestic outsourcing, the provision of military force takes place in conditions of high bilateral dependency, social embeddedness, specific contractual hazards, that taken together deter from traditional methods of contract enforcement (litigation and arbitration) and emphasize mechanisms based on reputational mechanisms and hierarchy.

These limitations should be attentively considered in shaping the role of contract standardization into a comprehensive regulatory strategy at national and international levels.

Keywords: private military and security companies, regulation, contract law, human rights, transactions costs

Suggested Citation

Calderai, Valentina, The Privatization of Military and Security Services and the Limits of Contract: Lessons from the US (July 17, 2011). EUI Working Papers MWP 2010/31 - Max Weber Programme, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1887688 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1887688

Valentina Calderai (Contact Author)

University of Pisa, Faculty of Economics ( email )

I-56126 Pisa
Italy

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
79
Abstract Views
528
rank
363,679
PlumX Metrics