The Deterrence Effects of U.S. Merger Policy Instruments

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 11-095/1

44 Pages Posted: 18 Jul 2011

See all articles by Joseph A. Clougherty

Joseph A. Clougherty

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Jo Seldeslachts

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB); German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 4, 2011

Abstract

We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect to the composition and frequency of future merger notifications. Data from the Annual Reports by the U.S. DOJ and FTC allow industry based measures over the 1986-1999 period of the conditional probabilities for eliciting investigations, challenges, prohibitions, court-wins and court-losses: deterrence variables akin to the traditional conditional probabilities from the economics of crime literature. We find the challenge-rate to robustly deter future horizontal (both relative and absolute) merger activity; the investigation-rate to slightly deter relative horizontal merger activity; the court-loss-rate to moderately affect absolute-horizontal merger activity; and the prohibition-rate and court-win-rate to not significantly deter future horizontal mergers. Accordingly, the conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e., remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence effect from amongst the different merger policy instruments.

Keywords: antitrust, deterrence, merger policy

JEL Classification: L40, L49, K21

Suggested Citation

Clougherty, Joseph A. and Seldeslachts, Jo, The Deterrence Effects of U.S. Merger Policy Instruments (July 4, 2011). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 11-095/1. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1888168 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1888168

Joseph A. Clougherty (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

1206 S. Sixth Street
350 Wohlers Hall, MC-706
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

Jo Seldeslachts

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstra├če 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
68
Abstract Views
658
rank
174,306
PlumX Metrics