What Does Nasdaq's High-Yield Bond Market Reveal About Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts?

Financial Management, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2000

Posted: 6 Dec 1999 Last revised: 27 Dec 2007

See all articles by Gordon J. Alexander

Gordon J. Alexander

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Amy K. Edwards

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

Michael G. Ferri

George Mason University

Abstract

We use data from Nasdaq's FIPS system for reporting transactions in selected high-yield corporate bonds to investigate the relationship between the returns on a firm's stock and the returns on its publicly traded, high-yield debt. Regression models and analysis of the behavior of the returns around events associated with agency conflict show that the returns follow complex patterns of similarity and divergence. Positive co-movement is the dominant form of the relationship, but opposite movement of the bond and stock returns around those events indicates agency conflicts between bondholders and stockholders.

Note: The Securities and Exchange Commission disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement of any SEC employee or Commissioner. This paper expresses the authors' views and does not necessarily reflect those of the Commission, the Commissioners, or other members of the staff.

JEL Classification: G30, G32

Suggested Citation

Alexander, Gordon J. and Edwards, Amy K. and Ferri, Michael G., What Does Nasdaq's High-Yield Bond Market Reveal About Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts?. Financial Management, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=189148

Gordon J. Alexander (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-624-8598 (Phone)
612-624-1335 (Fax)

Amy K. Edwards

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ( email )

100 F St NE
Washington, DC 20549-1105
United States
202-551-6663 (Phone)

Michael G. Ferri

George Mason University ( email )

School of Management
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1858 (Phone)

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