Trade Policy and Antitrust: Do Consumers Matter to Legislators?

14 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2011

See all articles by Robert M. Feinberg

Robert M. Feinberg

American University - Department of Economics

Thomas A. Husted

American University - Department of Economics

Kara M. Reynolds

American University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2011

Abstract

We provide one of the first efforts to measure the importance of consumer preferences in legislators' trade policy decisions by estimating the degree to which the level of antitrust enforcement in the legislator's state impacts his or her vote on free trade agreements. To the extent that antitrust and trade liberalization are both viewed as pro‚Äźconsumer in nature, we would expect to see a positive relationship between antitrust enforcement in their legislative district and Congressional votes in support of trade liberalization. We find evidence suggesting that consumer preferences do play a role in legislative decisions on trade policy.

Suggested Citation

Feinberg, Robert M. and Husted, Thomas A. and Reynolds, Kara M., Trade Policy and Antitrust: Do Consumers Matter to Legislators? (August 2011). Review of International Economics, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 525-538, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1892618 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2011.00963.x

Robert M. Feinberg

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8029
United States
202-885-3770 (Phone)
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Thomas A. Husted

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8029
United States

Kara M. Reynolds

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8029
United States
202-885-3768 (Phone)
202-885-3790 (Fax)

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