REVIEWING VERTICAL RESTRAINTS IN EUROPE: REFORM, KEY ISSUES AND NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT, Centre for Competition Policy, Forthcoming
18 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2011 Last revised: 9 Jan 2012
Date Written: November 1, 2010
This paper explores the issues involved in finding agreement in vertical cases, from the perspective of the antitrust laws of the EU. In borderline cases, the notion of agreement cannot comfortably be dissociated from the other conditions of application of article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. With this mutual interaction in sight, the relevant case law (judgments such as Sandoz, Bayer, Volkswagen, Ford, etc.) mostly makes sense as a coherent whole.
This paper was presented in November 2010 at an international conference directed by J.F. Bellis and J.M. Beneyto, and coordinated by J. Maillo ("Reviewing Vertical Restraints In Europe: Reform, Key Issues And National Enforcement". Centre for Competition Policy. Madrid, 11-12 november 2010). Publication of the volume collecting contributions to the conference is expected in the course of 2011.
Keywords: agreement, concerted action, vertical, unilateral acts, antitrust, Europe, EU, competition, pharmaceuticals, automotive, parallel trade
JEL Classification: K21, K40, L40, L42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Gippini-Fournier, Eric, The Notion of Agreement in a Vertical Context: Pieces of a Sliding Puzzle (November 1, 2010). REVIEWING VERTICAL RESTRAINTS IN EUROPE: REFORM, KEY ISSUES AND NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT, Centre for Competition Policy, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1892742