On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in a General Class of Social Choice Problems

24 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2011 Last revised: 19 Jul 2019

See all articles by Jacob K. Goeree

Jacob K. Goeree

University of Zurich

Alexey Kushnir

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

Date Written: July 31, 2011

Abstract

We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private values. We provide a short and constructive proof that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents. We demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of our approach with several examples. Finally, we show that the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when utilities are non-linear or when values are interdependent, multi-dimensional, or correlated.

Keywords: Bayesian implementation, dominant strategy implementation, mechanism design, social choice

Suggested Citation

Goeree, Jacob K. and Kushnir, Alexey I., On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in a General Class of Social Choice Problems (July 31, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1895286 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1895286

Jacob K. Goeree

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/faculty/jgoeree.html

Alexey I. Kushnir (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

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