On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in a General Class of Social Choice Problems
24 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2011 Last revised: 19 Jul 2019
Date Written: July 31, 2011
Abstract
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private values. We provide a short and constructive proof that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents. We demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of our approach with several examples. Finally, we show that the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when utilities are non-linear or when values are interdependent, multi-dimensional, or correlated.
Keywords: Bayesian implementation, dominant strategy implementation, mechanism design, social choice
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