Purchase - $5.00

Competition and Industry Structure for International Rail Transportation

37 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2011  

Guido Friebel

Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Marc Ivaldi

Toulouse School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jérôme Pouyet

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS); National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 2011

Abstract

This paper investigates various options for the organization of the railway industry when network operators require the access to multiple national networks to provide international (freight or passenger) transport services. The EU rail system provides a framework for our analysis. Returns-to-scale and the intensity of competition are key to understanding the impact of vertical integration or separation between infrastructure and operation services within each country in the presence of international transport services. We also consider an option in which a transnational infrastructure manager is in charge of offering a coordinated access to the national networks. In our model, it turns out to be an optimal industry structure.

Keywords: Network access, Transport economics, Vertical Separation

JEL Classification: L14, L42, L51, L92

Suggested Citation

Friebel, Guido and Ivaldi, Marc and Pouyet, Jérôme, Competition and Industry Structure for International Rail Transportation (July 2011). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8491. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1897997

Guido Friebel (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Marc Ivaldi

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allee de Brienne bat. F
Toulouse Cedex, F-31000
France
+33 5 61 12 8592 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 8637 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Jerome Pouyet

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) ( email )

28, rue des Saints-Peres
75007 Paris
France
+33 1 4458 2870 (Phone)
+33 1 4458 2880 (Fax)

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST)

15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri
Malakoff Cedex, 1 92245
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Paper statistics

Downloads
2
Abstract Views
555