Disagreement and Epistemic Arguments for Democracy

Politics, Philosophy & Economics. Prepublished January 4, 2013, DOI: 10.1177/1470594X12460642.

23 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2011 Last revised: 21 Jun 2017

See all articles by Sean Ingham

Sean Ingham

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: February 12, 2012

Abstract

Recent epistemic arguments for democracy aim to show that in some qualified sense, democratic institutions have a tendency to produce reasonable outcomes. They aim to do so without presupposing any narrow, controversial view of what the outcomes of democratic procedures should be, much as a good justification of a particular scientific research design does not presuppose the hypothesis that the research aims to test. This paper considers whether this aim is achievable. It asks, in particular, whether epistemic arguments can be reconciled with the commonly held view that disagreement about which laws and policies should be enacted is a fundamental, permanent feature of democratic politics and imposes constraints on how we understand the value of democratic procedures.

Suggested Citation

Ingham, Sean, Disagreement and Epistemic Arguments for Democracy (February 12, 2012). Politics, Philosophy & Economics. Prepublished January 4, 2013, DOI: 10.1177/1470594X12460642., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1898853 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1898853

Sean Ingham (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science ( email )

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La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
United States

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