Trading Cycles for School Choice

13 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2011 Last revised: 19 Oct 2011

Marek Pycia

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 31, 2011

Abstract

In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environ- ments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles mechanisms of Pycia and Ünver [2009], and show that the extended mechanisms are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. In particular, we construct the counterpart of Pápai [2000] hiererachical exchange mechanisms for environments with copies.

Suggested Citation

Pycia, Marek and Ünver, M. Utku, Trading Cycles for School Choice (July 31, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1899344 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1899344

Marek Pycia (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )

405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951361
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States

Utku Unver

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
+1 (617) 552 2217 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver

Paper statistics

Downloads
103
Rank
214,063
Abstract Views
470