Trading Cycles for School Choice

13 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2011 Last revised: 19 Oct 2011

See all articles by Marek Pycia

Marek Pycia

University of Zurich

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College, Department of Economics

Date Written: July 31, 2011

Abstract

In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environ- ments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles mechanisms of Pycia and Ünver [2009], and show that the extended mechanisms are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. In particular, we construct the counterpart of Pápai [2000] hiererachical exchange mechanisms for environments with copies.

Suggested Citation

Pycia, Marek and Unver, Utku, Trading Cycles for School Choice (July 31, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1899344 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1899344

Marek Pycia (Contact Author)

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Utku Unver

Boston College, Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
6175640771 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.bc.edu/utku-unver

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