The Microeconomics of Engagement: Marketization and Trust in China-North Korea Trade

34 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 16 Aug 2011

See all articles by Stephan M. Haggard

Stephan M. Haggard

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS)

Marcus Noland

Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics; East-West Center

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

A central hope of the strategy of engagement is that increased cross-border exchanges with North Korea will have the effect of encouraging the process of marketization and ultimately contribute to a moderation of the country’s foreign policy. Results from a unique survey of Chinese enterprises operating in North Korea reveal that trade is still largely dominated by state entities on the North Korean side, although we cannot rule out de facto privatization of exchange. However little trust is evident beyond the relationships among Chinese and North Korean state-owned enterprises. Formal networks and institutions - including dispute settlement mechanisms - are weak and do not appear to have consequences for relational contracting. Rather, firms rely on personal ties for identifying counterparties and resolving disputes. The weakness of formal institutions implies that the rapid growth in exchange does not conform with the expectations of the engagement model and may prove self-limiting. The results also cast doubt that engagement between China and North Korea, at least as it is currently proceeding, will foster reform and opening in the country.

Keywords: sanctions, trust, relational contracting, China, North Korea

JEL Classification: F5, P33, L14

Suggested Citation

Haggard, Stephan M. and Noland, Marcus, The Microeconomics of Engagement: Marketization and Trust in China-North Korea Trade (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1900131

Stephan M. Haggard (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519
United States
858-534-5781 (Phone)
858-534-3939 (Fax)

Marcus Noland

Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

East-West Center ( email )

1601 East-West Road
Honolulu, HI 96848-1601
United States

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