Options in the Arsenal: Are Repressive Tactics Complements or Substitutes?

32 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 18 Aug 2011

See all articles by Courtenay Conrad

Courtenay Conrad

Department of Political Science, University of California, Merced

Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt

University of North Texas

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

Leaders can select from a myriad of repressive techniques to quell their domestic po- litical opposition. In this project, we investigate (1) why states differ in their choice of repressive tactics, and (2) how individual states combine and trade-off between repressive tactics. In the absence of existing work on repressive policy complementarity and substitutability, we turn to the political science literature on foreign policy substitutability and the economics literature on complementarity and substitutability. By focusing on the expected costs and benefits of repression in general and of imprisonment, torture, and state-sponsored killing in particular, we develop a theory about the conditions under which state leaders choose packages of repressive techniques and/or substitute one repressive policy for another. We argue that leaders respond to the increasing costliness of type of repression by limiting the use of that tactic and ramping up other violations (i.e., through substitution), or by adding additional tactics into the mix to minimize tactic-specific costs (i.e., through complementarity).

Keywords: human rights, repression, substitutability, complementarity

Suggested Citation

Conrad, Courtenay and DeMeritt, Jacqueline H.R., Options in the Arsenal: Are Repressive Tactics Complements or Substitutes? (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1900721

Courtenay Conrad

Department of Political Science, University of California, Merced ( email )

5200 N. Lake Road
Merced, CA 95344
United States

Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt (Contact Author)

University of North Texas ( email )

1155 Union Circle #305340
Denton, TX 76203
United States

HOME PAGE: http://psci.unt.edu/~demeritt